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As technology has developed, Americans have come to carry their most private 
information around with them in their pockets in digital form on their cell phones.  A cell phone 
has immense storage capacity and can contain a wide variety of communicative information 
about its owner. In the past, there had been a disagreement among the lower courts as to whether 
police officers could search the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone when making an arrest. The 
United States Supreme Court settled this disagreement in Riley v. California; in that case, the 
Court held that the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This thesis discusses case law that preceded the 
United States Supreme Court case Riley v. California, that decision, and possible ramifications of 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley v. California,1 there was disagreement 
among the lower courts as to whether a cell phone search was part of the lawful exercise of 
police powers following an arrest. This disagreement was due to broad interpretations of the 
search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment. The United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as the California, Massachusetts, and 
Georgia Supreme Courts held warrantless cell phone searches should be allowed.2 The United 
States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit, as well as the Florida and Ohio Supreme Courts 
held that warrantless cell phone searches should not be allowed.3   
There were three Supreme Court cases which provided precedents for the rules governing 
searches incident to arrest. These cases are Chimel v. California,4 United States v. Robinson,5 
and Arizona v. Gant.6  
1 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). This was a consolidated case. See notes 7-8, infra 
and accompanying text. 
2 United States v. Flores – Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Murphy, 552 F. 
3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 51 
Cal. 4th 84 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. 2012); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 
979 N.E. 2d 210 (Mass. 2012). 
3 United States v. Wurie, 728 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724 (Fla. 
2013); State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163 (Ohio 2009). 
4 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
5 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
6 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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 On January 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of 
certiorari for both People v. Riley7 and United States v. Wurie8 consolidated to the issue of 
whether warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest were constitutional. On June 25, 2014, 
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Riley v. California.9 The Supreme Court 
held that police cannot search a phone upon arrest without a search warrant.10 
This decision was a shocking advancement from the Supreme Court’s prior stand on 
privacy and technology. The revolutionary decision in Riley v. California provided clarity and 
unity between Justices which had not been present in prior Supreme Court cases regarding 
technology. Significant privacy cases involving technology that were decided by the Supreme 
Court prior to this case include Katz v. United States,11 Smith v. Maryland,12 Kyllo v. United 
States,13 City of Ontario, California v. Quon,14 and United States v. Jones.15 
7 People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
8 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, aff’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473 (2014). 
9 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). For ease of reference, the consolidated cases will 
be referred to as Riley v. California.  
10 Id. at 2493. 
11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
12 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
13 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
14 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
15 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
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 The focus of this thesis will be the Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California. To 
provide background information for the reader, the thesis will first review prior case law 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment and previous significant Supreme Court cases on privacy. 
Next, the thesis will examine the First Circuit decision in United States v. Wurie, and the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals of California decision in People v. Riley prior to discussing the United 




 II. CASE LAW 
 
A. Fourth Amendment Exception for Warrantless Search 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.16 
The fact that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches leads to the question 
of what constitutes a reasonable search. This has been determined through case law. In Riley v. 
California, the United States Supreme Court referred to its prior decisions in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton,17 and Brigham City v. Stuart.18 
In the United States Supreme Court case Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,19 the 
Supreme Court stated, “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the 
obtaining of a judicial warrant.”20 Thus, the starting point in considering interpretation of the 
16 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
17 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
18 Brighham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).  
19 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
20 Id. at 653.  
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 Fourth Amendment is that a warrant is generally required. The Court elaborated on this by 
stating: 
As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the 
constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.” At least in a case 
such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving 
the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was 
enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “is judged 
by balancing  its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against 
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”21 
However, in the United States Supreme Court case Brigham City v. Stuart,22 the Court 
recognized exceptions to the general rule. The Court held that a warrant is not needed for all 
searches. The Supreme Court stated, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment 
is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”23 
As provided in Brigham City v. Stuart, case law exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
permit a police officer to conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant. These exceptions 
have been applied to a police officer bringing a suspect into custody and allow a police officer to 
conduct a search incident to arrest in specific situations. The three United States Supreme Court 
cases which set precedent for an arrest-related search are Chimel v. California,24 United States v. 
21 Id at 652. 
22 Brighham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).  
23 Id. at 403.  
24 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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 Robinson,25 and Arizona v. Gant.26 The Court decided the first two cases within a space of four 
years, but the gap between the second and third was more than thirty five years.  
1. Chimel v. California 
In the United States Supreme Court case Chimel v. California, police officers searched 
Ted Steven Chimel’s entire three bedroom house, including the attic, garage and workshop 
following his arrest.27  The officers went as far as to go through the contents of drawers during 
the search which took between 45 minutes and an hour.28  
The modern search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was created in Chimel v. California. In 
Chimel, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in 
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well 
be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable 
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's 
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.29 
This means that, in order for a search-incident-to-arrest to be constitutional, it must be meant to 
either protect the officer from harm or prevent evidence from being destroyed. These two 
reasons for allowing searches without warrants are carried forward in Robinson and Gant. 
25 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
26 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
27 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 754.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 762-63. 
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 2. United States v. Robinson 
In the United States Supreme Court case United States v. Robinson,30 the Court used the 
rationale from Chimel31 to determine whether a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest 
was reasonable.  
In Robinson, a police officer stopped Wille Robinson, Jr. because the officer believed 
Robinson was driving with a revoked operator’s permit.32 During the patdown at the time of 
Robinson’s arrest, the officer felt an object in Robinson’s left breast pocket.33 The officer 
removed the object from Robinson’s pocket and discovered it was a pack of cigarettes.34 
However, the officer stated he still did not know what was inside the cigarette pack.35 Upon 
looking inside the cigarette pack, he discovered it contained fourteen gelatin capsules of 
heroin.36  
Based on the rationale used in Chimel, it is necessary for a police officer to search an 
arrestee’s person in order to locate possible weapons and preserve any evidence which could be 
30 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
31 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
32 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221. 
33 Id. at 222. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
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 destroyed.37 The Supreme Court held that the search of Robinson’s person and seizure of the 
heroin were permissible under the Fourth Amendment.38 The Court stated: 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion 
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which 
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful 
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under 
that Amendment.39 
3. Arizona v. Gant 
In the United States Supreme Court case Arizona v. Gant,40 the Court used the rationale 
from Chimel41 to determine the constitutionality of searching an arrestee’s vehicle incident to 
arrest. The search incident to arrest exception had been left open-ended prior to this decision.  
In Gant, police officers found cocaine in a jacket pocket in the backsat of Rodney Gant’s 
vehicle during a search following his arrest for driving with a suspended license.42 Gant had been 
arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car prior to the beginning of the search.43 
The United States Supreme Court held that the search in this case was unreasonable.44 
The Supreme Court stated: 
37 Id. at 225. 
38 Id. at 236. 
39 Id. at 235. 
40 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
41 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
42 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. 
43 Id.  
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 Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's 
vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another 
exception to the warrant requirement applies.45 
Because Gant had been secured in the back of a patrol car prior to the search, there was 
no way he could have reached inside the car while the search was occurring. This comes 
down to the arrestee having access to the contents of the vehicle.  
 
B. Previous Significant Supreme Court Privacy Cases 
The United States Supreme Court hears only a very small number of all the cases from 
across the United States every year. Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Riley v. 
California,46 very few cases had been decided on the relationship between privacy and 
technology. These cases included Katz v. United States,47 Smith v. Maryland,48 Kyllo v. United 
States,49 City of Ontario, California v. Quon,50 and United States v. Jones.51 Many of these cases 
involved now outdated technology or technology that was quite different from cell phone 
44 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S at 351. 
45 Id. 
46 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473. 
47 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
48 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
49 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
50 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
51 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
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 searches. These cases made it extremely difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would rule in 
Riley v. California.  
1. Katz v. United States 
In Katz v. United States,52 the United States Supreme Court stated that, “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”53 In this case, the FBI attached an electronic listening 
device to the outside of a phone booth and recorded the conversations that occurred inside.54  
The government argued that because there was no physical trespass into the area occupied by 
Katz no violation to the Fourth Amendment occurred; however, the Supreme Court did not 
agree.  
The concurring opinion in Katz created the two prong test, which has since become the 
test used to tell if a warrantless search is constitutional.  This test states, “there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.”55  
2. Smith v. Maryland 
In the United States Supreme Court case, Smith v. Maryland,56 the police requested that a 
pen register be installed at the phone company’s central office to record the telephone numbers 
52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
53 Id. at 351. 
54 Id. at 348. 
55 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
56 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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 dialed from the petitioner’s home.57 In Smith, the court held that the search was constitutional 
because the pen register had extremely limited capabilities. Because the police were only 
accessing the numbers dialed from the phone rather than communicative information, it was not 
reasonable for the petitioner to believe this information was private because it was socially 
accepted that the telephone company had access to this information.58 
3. Kyllo v. United States 
In the United States Supreme Court case, Kyllo v. United States,59 police used a thermal 
imager to scan Danny Kyllo’s home in order to detect the heat from lights used to grow 
marijuana. The police found that the roof over the garage and wall of the petitioner’s home was 
relatively hot in comparison to the rest of the house and the other homes in the triplex.60 The 
Court was concerned with the lack of limits on the powers of technology to shrink citizen’s 
constitutional right to privacy.61  
The United States Supreme Court held that, “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’ 
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”62 The Court considered the use of a 
57 Id. at 737. 
58 Id. at 745.  
59 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
60 Id. at 30.  
61 Id. at 34.  
62 Id. at 27. 
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 thermal imager, which only showed the temperature of the outside of the house in comparison 
with the other homes in the triplex, to violate the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right. In Kyllo, 
although the officers remained on a public street, they “engaged in more than naked-eye 
surveillance of a home.”63   
4. City of Ontario, California v. Quon 
 In the United States Supreme Court case City of Ontario, California v. Quon,64 the city 
issued pagers with texting capabilities to members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
Team for work related use.65 Each pager was allotted a set number of characters to send or 
receive each month.66 Jeff Quon worked for the Ontario Police Department as a police sergeant 
and SWAT Team member.67 Quon exceeded the allotted number of characters for several 
months until the Lieutenant in charge of the pagers decided to request the transcripts of the 
officers’ text messages in order to determine whether the character limit was too low or if the 
employees were using the pagers for personal messages.68 The Lieutenant discovered many of 
the messages sent and received on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually 
63 Id. at 33.  
64 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
65 Id. at 750-51. 
66 Id. at 750. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 752. 
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 explicit.69 Quon was allegedly disciplined for using his pager for personal messages while on 
duty.70  
 Quon filed suit against the City of Ontario, California, alleging his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated by the police department obtaining and examining the transcripts of his text 
messages.71 The United States Supreme Court held, “[b]ecause the search was motivated by a 
legitimate work-related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was 
reasonable.”72 
5. United States v. Jones 
In the United States Supreme Court case United States v. Jones,73 the FBI attached a GPS 
device to the undercarriage of Antoine Jones’ Jeep Grand Cherokee because they suspected him 
of trafficking narcotics. The respondent’s location was tracked by satellite within 50 to 100 feet 
for 28 days.74 The Court held that, “the government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor that vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search.”75 In 
69 Id. at 753. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 764.  
73 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
74 Id. at 947.  
75 Id. at 949.  
13 
 
                                                 
 Jones, the Court stated that the respondent’s car was one of his “effects” protected under the 
Fourth Amendment.76 
Despite the Supreme Court justices agreeing in the opinion, there was disagreement over 
what constituted the unconstitutional search: the attachment of the GPS device or the long term 
monitoring. The majority opinion held that the attachment of a GPS device to a car was the 
violation of Jones’s rights; Justices Alito and Sotomayor concurred. 77  Justice Alito concurred 
that Jones’ rights were violated by the monitoring of his movements rather than through the 
physical trespass to his vehicle.78 Justice, Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined 
Justice Alito in concurring in the judgment.79 Justice Alito stated: 
This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century surveillance technique, the 
use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device to monitor a vehicle's 
movements for an extended period of time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to 
decide this case based on 18th-century tort law.80 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 945. 
78 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
79 Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
80 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
14 
 
                                                 
 III.  LOWER COURT DECISION IN WURIE AND RILEY 
 
The Supreme Court case, Riley v. California,81 consolidates two cases; People v. Riley82 
and United States v. Wurie.83 People v. Riley was decided in the Fourth District Court of Appeals 
of California. United States v. Wurie was decided in the First Circuit of the United States Court 
of Appeals. The two courts reached opposite holdings on the issue of whether or not cell phones 
could be searched incident to arrest. The facts in each case differed in the type information 
retrieved from the phone, the type of phone that was searched, and the location of the phone at 
the time of the arrest.  
A. United States v. Wurie  
In United States v. Wurie, the defendant was arrested because he was suspected of being 
involved in a drug sale.84 Upon arrest, the officers took two cell phones from the defendant. One 
of the cell phones received repeated phone calls from a number programmed as “my house” as 
read from the external screen on the phone. The officers opened the phone and observed that the 
phone’s wallpaper was a picture of a young woman with baby.85 The officers then looked up the 
81 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
82 People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
83 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, aff’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473 (2014). 
84 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1. 
85 Id. at 2. 
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 address of the phone number programmed as home and went to that address. They could see a 
woman inside who looked like the woman on the phone’s wallpaper and a baby. They then got a 
warrant and seized drugs and a firearm from the residence.86  
The First Circuit Court held that the search incident to arrest exception recognized in 
Chimel, Robinson, and Gant, did not allow warrantless cell phone searches. It stated, “the search-
incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of a cell phone seized from 
an arrestee’s person, because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever 
necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.”87 The court reasoned 
that it could not justify a warrantless cell phone search based on previous cases regarding a 
search incident to arrest  because “the officer who conducted the search in Robinson had no way 
of knowing what he might find in the cigarette pack, which therefore posed a safety risk. The 
officers who searched Wurie’s phone, on the other hand, knew exactly what they would find 
therein: data.”88 The court stated: 
In our view . . . what distinguishes a warrantless search of the data within a 
modern cell phone from the inspection of an arrestee’s cigarette pack or the 
examination of his clothing is not just the nature of the item searched, but the 
nature and scope of the search itself.89  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 13.  
88 Id. at 10. 
89 Id. at 9. 
16 
 
                                                 
 B. People v. Riley 
In People v. Riley, three gang members standing near the defendant’s Oldsmobile shot at 
a car as it drove through an intersection.90 Later that month, the defendant was driving his Lexus 
when he was stopped by the police. The vehicle was impounded because the defendant was 
driving with a suspended license; it is departmental policy for an inventory search to be 
conducted at impound.91 Upon searching the arrestee and vehicle, the officers found the gun used 
in the shooting and seized the defendant’s cell phone. In addition to the initial search of the cell 
phone at the scene, a detective who specialized in gangs examined the phone hours later at the 
police station.92 The cell phone contained picture and videos showing the defendant’s gang 
affiliation.93  The cell phone records showed his phone was used near the scene of the shooting at 
around the same time, and near the location where police found his Oldsmobile 30 minutes after 
the shooting.94 
In this case, the appellate court held that the warrantless cell phone search was allowed, 
relying on the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Diaz which held that the Fourth 
Amendment allows police officers to search cell phones incident to arrest without a warrant, as 
long as the cell phone is immediately associated with the arrestee’s person.95  The court in Riley 
90 People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
91 Id. at *2. 
92 Id. at *3. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011). 
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 stated that “a delayed search of an item immediately associated with the arrestee’s person may be 
justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest without consideration as to whether an exigency 
for the search exists.”96  
  
96 People v. Riley, 2013 WL 475242 at *4. There was question as to whether the cell phone was 
immediately associated with Riley’s person. Some evidence showed the phone had been 
removed from the defendant’s pocket and was on the seat of the car at the time the arrest 
occurred. However, due to the phone’s location being a question of fact rather than a question of 
law, the appellate court could not rule on this. 
18 
 
                                                 
 III. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN WURIE AND RILEY 
 
On January 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of 
certiorari for both People v. Riley97 and United States v. Wurie98 consolidated to the issue of 
whether warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest were constitutional. The Supreme 
Court stated, “[t]hese two cases raise a common question: whether the police may, without a 
warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been 
arrested.”99 
The United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Riley v. California on 
June 25, 2014. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court,100  and Justice Alito 
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.101 The United States Supreme Court held that a 
cell phone search incident to arrest was not constitutional for several reasons.102  
 
97 People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014). 
98 United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014). 
99 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2437, 2480. 
100Id. at 2480. 
101 Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring). 
102 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2482-95. 
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 A. Majority Opinion 
The United States Supreme Court described a smart phone as “a cell phone with a broad 
range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and 
internet connectivity.”103 In regards to the technological advances in the capabilities of a cell 
phone, the Court stated: 
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects 
that might be kept on an arrestee's person. The term “cell phone” is itself 
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also 
happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be 
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, 
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.104 
The Supreme Court even went so far as to describe a cell phone as “such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”105 
The immense storage capacity of a cell phone alone was enough to make the Supreme 
Court question the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches.106 In the past, the search 
of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest was limited to the items the arrestee could physically 
carry.107 However, with the modern developments of cell phones the amount of information an 
103 Id. at 2480.  
104 Id. at 2489. 
105 Id. at 2484. 




                                                 
 arrestee could have on the arrestee’s person is virtually limitless. When considering the storage 
capacity of a cell phone, the Court stated: 
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for 
privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of 
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that 
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's 
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than 
previously possible. The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed 
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; 
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. 
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even 
earlier.108 
In addition to considering the quantitative amount of data stored in a cell phone, the 
Supreme Court also considered the qualitative content of the information. The Court stated, 
“[a]lthough the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical records by quantity 
alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively different.”109 The Court continued by 
considering the specific types of qualitative information that could be gathered through the 
warrantless search of a cell phone. First, an arrestee’s internet browsing history on an internet 
enabled cell phone reveals private interests and concerns.110 Also, Mobile application software, 
or “apps,” provide a wide range tools which can be used in all aspects of a person’s life.111 The 
Supreme Court stated, “[t]he average smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can 
form a revealing montage of the user’s life.”112 Finally, many cell phones record historic location 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 2490. 
110 Id.  




                                                 
 information as a standard feature.113 The Court compared this type of tracking to the GPS 
monitoring in Jones.114 Like a GPS tracking device, cell phones can “reconstruct someone’s 
specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular 
building.”115  
In regard to the previously established search incident to arrest exceptions created to 
ensure the police officers’ safety and prevent destruction of evidence while making an arrest, the 
Supreme Court stated, “[w]hile Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the 
context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital content 
on cell phones.”116 There is no comparable risk of harm to officers or destruction of evidence 
when the search is of digital data.117 Because the search of a cell phone provides a police officer 
with such a vast amount of personal information, “[a] search of the information on a cell phone 
bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.118  
The United States Supreme Court stated, “[w]e therefore decline to extend Robinson to 
searches of data on cell phones, and hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant 
before conducting such a search.”119 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2484. 
117 Id. at 2485. 




                                                 
 Law enforcement remains free to examine the physical cell phone to make sure it is not 
hiding a weapon; however, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a 
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”120  The Court stated 
that, “[o]nce any officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, 
however, data on the phone can endanger no one.”121 
An argument made in the case was that the ability to search a cell phone could keep a 
police officer safe in indirect ways.122 For example, an officer would have a warning when 
others were on the way to meet the arrestee. However, the Court stated that, “neither the United 
States nor California offers evidence to suggest their concerns are based on actual 
experience.”123 Also, this proposed consideration broadens Chimel which was concerned with 
the arrestee himself accessing a weapon.124 
In regards to preventing the destruction of evidence, the United States Supreme Court 
stated, “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that 
the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.”125 However, this 
may still leave the data vulnerable to remote wiping or data encryption.126  
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2486. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
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 As with the rationale of preventing harm to police officers, “these broader concerns about 
the loss of evidence are distinct from Chimel’s focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by 
trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his reach.”127 In the case of remote wiping, the 
destruction of evidence is typically done by a third party who is not even present at the time of 
the arrest.128 In the case of data encryption, the destruction of evidence is done by the ordinary 
operation of the phone’s security features.129 There was also little evidence to show either 
problem is a prevalent issue or that the ability to conduct a warrantless search would make a 
difference.130 The Court continued to point out that there were numerous measures that could be 
taken to prevent the destruction of evidence without conducting a warrantless search, and that in 
the event an officer truly was presented with a now or never situation to retrieve information the 
office could then rely exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately.131  
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the 
most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form 
many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad 
array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone 
is.132 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 2486-87. 
131 Id. at 2487. 
132 Id. at 2491. 
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 The privacy interests at stake are further complicated by the fact that much of the data 
found in cell phones is not stored on the device itself but in a remote location.133 In comparison 
with Robinson, “[t]reating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be searched incident 
to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.”134 However, the Court continued, “but the 
analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap 
of a screen.”135 The Supreme Court stated, “[t]he possibility that a search might extend well 
beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee is yet another reason that the 
privacy interests here dwarf those in Robinson.”136 
It is historically recognized through case law that “the warrant requirement is ‘an 
important working part of our machinery of government.’”137 The Supreme Court stated, “[o]ur 
holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead 
that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized 
incident to arrest.”138 Despite this denial of the search incident to arrest exception, “other case-
specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone.”139 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 2493.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 2494.  
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 With the many capabilities of modern cell phones, “[w]ith all they contain and all they 
may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”140 The Supreme Court stated: 
The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his 
hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which 
the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before 
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a 
warrant.141 
 
B. Concurring Opinion 
 In the concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated, “I agree with the Court that law 
enforcement officers, in conducting a lawful search incident to arrest, must generally obtain a 
warrant before searching information stored or accessible on a cell phone.”142 However, he wrote 
separately to address two points.  
Justice Alito’s first point was that he was “not convinced at this time the ancient rule on 
searches incident to arrest is based exclusively (or even primarily) on the need to protect the 
safety of arresting officers and the need to prevent the destruction of evidence.”143 The rule was 
not created until over a century after the Fourth Amendment was adopted.144 While he agreed 
that cell phones should not be searched without a warrant incident to arrest, he did not feel the 
140 Id. at 2494-95.  
141 Id. at 2495. 
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
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 Court should based this decision on the rationale in Chimel.145 He stated, “I think it is a mistake 
to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these that concern the search of the person of 
arrestees.”146 Chimel involved the lawfulness of searching the scene of an arrest, not the items on 
an arrestee’s person at the time of the arrest.147  Once the items are taken away from the arrestee 
incident to arrest, the concerns in Chimel are eliminated and therefore, the rationale is 
inapplicable.148  
Justice Alito continued by pointing out that this decision is likely to lead to anomalies.149 
He illustrated this anomaly by pointing out that if two defendants are arrested, and the first 
defendant has his phone bill in his pocket while the second has his cell phone in his pocket, both 
of which contain the record of incriminating phone calls, only the defendant with the physical 
record would have the information seized and examined without a warrant.150 However, Justice 
Alito stated he did not see a workable alternative.151  
His second point was that he would reconsider the decision if Congress or a state 
legislature were to “enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of 
information or perhaps other variables.”152 Following the Supreme Court decision in Katz, 
145 Id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring). 
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
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 Congress reacted by enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.153 Electronic surveillance has since been primarily governed by the act rather than the 
Supreme Court decision.154 
Legislators are in a better position to assess the legitimate needs of law enforcement and 
the privacy interests of cell phone owners.155 Justice Alito stated: 
 [I]t would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left 
primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth 
Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we 
are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that 
almost certainly will take place in the future.156 
 
  
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 2497-98 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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 IV. REASONING AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. Cell Phone Use 
According to a survey done by the Pew Research Center,157  ninety-one percent of all 
Americans owned a cell phone in 2013.158 Sixty-one percent of those cell phones are Smart 
Phones.159 Modern cell phones have advanced to do much more than simply make telephone 
calls. Society has reached a point where virtually a person’s entire life is likely to be on their cell 
phone. Common Smart Phone capabilities include texting, accessing the internet, sending or 
receiving emails, taking photographs, downloading apps, navigating, and scheduling.  
The same survey by the Pew Research Center showed that eighty-one percent of all cell 
phone owners use their phones to send or receive text messages and fifty-two percent of 
Americans use their phones to send or receive emails.160 During a search incident to arrest, these 
communications would provide officers with documentation of all written communications made 
by the arrestee. With such a large portion of Americans’ communication occurring digitally, 
police officers would have access to an immense amount of private information while searching 
a cell phone. 
157 The Pew Research Center’s research was referenced in Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2491 (2014). 
158 Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, September 19, 
2013, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/19/cell-phone-activities-2013/.  





                                                 
 Sixty three percent of all Americans use their cell phone to access the internet.161 In fact, 
accessing the internet via cell phones has become so popular, thirty-four percent of people who 
use their cell phones to access the internet say they typically use their cell phone to access the 
internet over other any other device such as a laptop, desktop or tablet.162 This statistic increases 
greatly in young adults; half of all internet users between eighteen and twenty nine years old 
primarily use the internet on their cell phone.163 Cell phones keep an internet history, which 
would provide police officers with the search and browsing history. For people who conduct 
most of their internet use on their cell phone, this would provide police officers with a great deal 
of personal information.   
The same survey also found that sixty-five percent of Smart Phone users use their phones 
to get turn-by-turn navigation or directions while driving.164 Forty-nine percent of all cell phone 
users use their phones to look up direction, recommendations, and other location related 
information.165 In addition to this, most phones record location at all times. According to the 
2013 Mobile Consumer Habit survey,166 seventy two percent of adults in the United States who 
161 Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
September 16, 2013, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/16/cell-internet-use-2013/. 
162 Id.   
163 Lee Rainie & Susannah Fox, Just-in-time Information through Mobile Connections, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, May 7, 2012, http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/05/07/just-in-time-
information-through-mobile-connections/ 
164 Duggan & Smith, Supra note 161. 
165 Duggan, Supra note 158. 
166 The 2013 Mobile Consumer Habit survey done for Jumio was referenced in Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 at 2490 (2014). 
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 own smart phones keep their phone within five feet of them the majority of the time.167 This 
provides police officers with a GPS location device for nearly every person in the United States; 
cell phones have become the modern equivalent of the tracking device used in Jones. 
 Despite the fact that over half of all Americans now have Smart Phones, only eighteen 
percent of Americans sixty five years or older are Smart Phone owners.168 Seventy-seven percent 
do own a cell phone, but these are primarily basic cell phone devices.169 These numbers are 
dramatically contrasted by the fact that seventy-nine percent of Americans between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-four years old, and eighty-one percent of Americans between the ages of 
twenty-five and thirty-four years old are Smart Phone owners.170  
There is a striking difference between the uses of cell phones through the different 
generations. Ninety-seven percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine 
years old, and ninety-four percent between thirty and forty-nine years old send or receive text 
messages.171 These statistics begin to drop with only seventy-five percent of Americans between 
fifty and sixty-four years old sending or receiving text messages, but drop drastically with only 
167 Jumio, Americans Can’t Put Down Their Smart Phones Even During Sex, July 11, 2013,  
https://www.jumio.com/2013/07/americans-cant-put-down-their-smartphones-even-during-sex/ 
168 Aaron Smith, Older Adults and Technology Use, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, April 3, 2014,  
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-adults-and-technology-use/ 
169 Id.  
170 Smith, Supra note 159. 
171 Duggan, Supra note 158. 
31 
 
                                                 
 thirty-five percent of Americans sixty-five years and older sending or receiving text messages.172 
Similar drops in use occur with every other studied common cell phone use.173  
The United States Supreme Court Justices range in age from fifty-four to eighty-one 
years old.174 However, in comparison with previous Supreme Court decisions, Riley  shows a 
much better grasp on the relationship of technology and privacy.  
B. Comparison to Prior Supreme Court Cases 
The United States Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley showed clarity that had 
not yet been seen in a United States Supreme Court case regarding the relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment and technology. While the decision was a shocking advancement from 
previous Supreme Court privacy cases, strands of reasoning from prior cases can be pieced 
together in the reasoning of Riley.  
Over the past few decades, technology has progressed rapidly. Modern cell phones 
combine many different types of technology into one handheld device. There has been a vast 
increase in technological capabilities since many of the previous Supreme Court cases involving 
technology and privacy. The concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, which involved 
surveillance of a phone booth, created the two prong test.  In applying the second prong to Riley, 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
174 Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2014). Justice Kegan: 54 years old; Chief Justice Roberts: 59 years old; 
Justice Sotomayor: 60 years old; Justice Alito: 64 years old; Justice Thomas: 66 years old; 
Justice Breyer: 76 years old; Justice Kennedy: 78 years old; Justice Scalia: 78 years old; Justice 
Ginsburg: 81 years old.  
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 society would not agree that the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest was 
reasonable. Cell phones are such a common item in the United States; Americans would not find 
it reasonable to give police officers the right to virtually go through life without a warrant to 
justify the search. In Smith, which the was decided in 1979, the United States Supreme Court 
held that it was constitutional to install a pen register because the device records such a small 
amount of information.  A pen register is a device that simply records the telephone numbers 
dials from a particular phone; a Smart Phone contains much more communicative information. 
Even more recent Supreme Court cases like Quon, which was decided in 2010, involve 
technology that is long out of date. The United States Supreme Court was already concerned 
with the lack of limitations on the powers of technology to limit constitutional rights when the 
Court decided Kyllo in 2011. The decision held that warrantless searches using technology 
unavailable to the general public were unconstitutional; however, this led to the question of what 
would happen when the technology became readily available. While most Americans have a cell 
phone now, twenty years ago they were far from readily available. Finally, the splintered 
decision in Jones was reached just two years ago. The clarity in the United Stated Supreme 
Court’s decision in Riley shows great improvement in the Justices’ understanding of the 
relationship between privacy and technology.  
C. Future Application 
A United States Supreme Court decision like this one is likely to have many future 
applications. Riley v. California found against the majority of the lower courts’ decisions in prior 
33 
 
 cases across the country.175 Most lower courts had held that cell phone searches incident to arrest 
were constitutional. The decision in Riley changed the search policies in police departments 
across the country. As a result, it will become more difficult for police to gather evidence against 
suspects. Even the United States Supreme Court recognized that its decision would “have an 
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”176 However, the Court concluded, 
“[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”177 
With technology constantly developing, both the number of devices with Smart Phone 
capabilities and the capabilities of typical Smart Phones are continually increasing. Many new 
wearable devices are being developed with Smart Phone capabilities. These devices have the 
capabilities of a Smart Phone, except they are attached to the user’s person at all times. This 
would advance the location data recorded in the device to a precise record of the wearer’s 
location at all times. An example of a wearable device that is gaining popularity is the Smart 
Watch. Many Smart Watches include fitness applications which record the user’s location, the 
rate at which they are moving, and their heart rate. The combination of this information could be 
very communicative of a suspect’s activities at the time a crime occurred. Smart Watches will 
also advance to  include the developing capabilities of Smart Phones. One feature that is 
175 Lower courts that ruled cell phone searches incident to arrest were constitutional: United 
States v. Flores – Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Murphy, 552 F. 3d 405 
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 
84 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. 2012); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 
N.E. 2d 210 (Mass. 2012).  Lower courts that ruled cell phone searches incident to arrest were 
unconstitutional: United States v. Wurie, 728 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Smallwood v. State, 113 
So. 3d 724 (Fla. 2013); State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163 (Ohio 2009). 
176 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
177 Id.  
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 developing in Smart Phones that will affect the decision in Riley v. California is the use of 
biometric security. Currently some Smart Phones can be unlocked using the user’s finger print; 
however, in the future Smart Phones could use facial recognition or voice recognition to unlock 
the phone. This new development could make it more difficult for police officers to unlock a 
phone once it has been taken from an arrestee.  
In the United States Supreme Court decision, the Justices provided that if there was ever 
a situation where officers only had one chance to retrieve information, they may rely on exigent 
circumstances to retrieve the information.178 The United States Supreme Court used exigent 
circumstances to “address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested.”179 
These hypotheticals included a suspect’s text messages with accomplices regarding detonating a 
bomb, and  location information in a child abductor’s phone showing the child’s location.180 
However, two arguments brought by the petitioner were much less extreme: remote wiping and 
data encryption.181 The Supreme Court stated there was little evidence to show this was a 
prevalent issue; yet this leads to the question of what happens if these now or never 
circumstances become the normal circumstances as technology develops.  
There have already been some serious issues following the decision. With the constant 
development of technology, the assumption in Riley v. California that information can be 
retrieved later with a warrant may already be out of date only months after the decision was 
178 Id. at 2478. 
179 Id. at 2494. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 2487.  
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 released.182  On September 18, 2014, Apple, Inc. announced a new privacy policy which states 
that the company will no longer unlock iPhones or iPads for police, even if they have a 
warrant.183 It is still possible for police to access data stored in the iCloud with a search warrant, 
but iPhone users can easily prevent police from accessing their information by turning off their 
phone’s data stream to their iCloud.184  Changes in technology like this one could cause officers 
to always claim exigent circumstances to search a phone incident to arrest due to their inability to 
access the information in phones in the future.  
The iCloud, and other storage services that keep information in a remote location, raises 
another issue with the constitutionality of cell phone searches incident to arrest. These systems 
connect all of a user’s devices together, allowing them to access information on their tablet or 
laptop from their cell phone. The Court stated, “such a search would be like finding a key in a 
suspect's pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a house.”185 
However, it is difficult to tell the difference between data physically stored on the phone and 
data stored anywhere in the world.186  
182 Laurie L. Levenson, A Pressing Need for Access to Cellphone Data, THE NATIONAL LAW 
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185 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
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 While the United States Supreme Court decision is clear in its present application, it 
leaves many questions unanswered as to the future application. An example of one future issue 
with cell phone searches was brought up during the oral arguments when Justice Sotomayor 
asked what happens to the data once the cell phone has been searched.187 There are many future 
ramifications which have not been touched upon in Riley so it will be left for future cases, and 
potentially legislation, to decide.  
These issues lead to the second point of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion; he expressed 
his hope that legislation will soon govern the search of cell phones incident to arrest.188 He stated 
that Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
following the decision in Katz.189 Electronic surveillance is primarily governed by the Act rather 
than the Supreme Court decision.190  
  
187 Jane Anne Murray, Once the government seizes tablets of smartphones, can it use the stored 




188 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring). 
189 Id.  
190 Id.  
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 V. CONCLUSION 
 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California is a step in the right 
direction, but technology is constantly developing at a much faster rate that the Supreme Court 
can issue decisions. While this decision will likely be outdated in the very near future, the case 
showed the Supreme Court Justices have a much more advanced understanding of technology 
and the impact it could have on privacy in the United States than they had in previous cases on 
other technology-related matters. The largest impact of Riley could be seen broadly as a potential 
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